We implement a simple two-shop search model in the laboratory with the aim of testing if consumers behave di¤erently in equivalent situations, where prices are displayed either as net prices or as gross prices with discounts.
Introduction
Retail-price promotions are ubiquitous in modern markets. Motivated by di¤erent marketing strategies, promotions can take various forms: in-store price discounts, coupons, mail-in rebates, everyday lowest price guarantees, etc. The promotions are usually accompanied by extensive and costly advertisement campaigns. The ultimate goal of these measures is to increase sales, and more importantly to increase sellers'pro…ts. Price promotions may simply create more demand due to the lower resulting prices. Price promotions may also increase pro…ts through intertemporal price discrimination. Temporary price promotions lead to buyers facing di¤erent prices for the same product over time. Economic theories suggest that sellers can under certain circumstances extract more surplus from consumers with di¤erent product valuations by using temporary discounts. 1 It is not surprising that genuine price reductions increase sales. However, a look at the large literature in marketing science on the e¤ects of di¤erently framed price promotions suggests that not only the resulting net price but also the way a price is presented might in ‡uence purchase decisions. In an early study, Inman et al. (1990) …nd that some customers react to promotion announcements or signals (e.g.
attaching an "everyday lowest price"tag) even without further evidence that a real price cut has taken place. Krishna et al. (2002) provide a meta-analysis of 20 publications on how price presentation a¤ects consumers'perceived savings and thereby in ‡uences their probability to purchase a certain product. The study shows that the buyers'perception of the promotion value is in ‡uenced by both price-framing e¤ects (e.g., whether a reference price is provided) and situational e¤ects (e.g., whether the price promotion is on a national brand or a generic brand). Kim and Kramer (2006) …nd that individuals, who do not enjoy exerting calculation e¤ort (i.e. having a low need for cognition) fail to accurately calculate net prices. Consequently, these individuals are less likely to buy if prices are listed as gross prices with separate relative discounts, and more likely to buy if prices are partitioned as base prices plus surcharges than individuals who are inclined to exert more calculation e¤ort.
These studies suggest that there might be a pure price-framing e¤ect. We are interested in the e¤ect of pure price framing in a search environment. For this purpose we need to control for the actual savings from discounts and the expected prices in all shops selling the same product. This is very di¢ cult to achieve in hypothetical choice studies or in the …eld. For this reason we use laboratory experiments.
Moreover, we employ the simplest possible environment capturing the essence of the consumer's decision problem. If one assumes that increased complexity leads to larger decision biases, then the results from our experimental study can be seen as a lower bound for the real impact of price framing. In other words, if we …nd price-framing e¤ects in our very simple decision task, then we can be con…dent that they also exist in the real world, where purchasing decisions are much more complex.
An other advantage of laboratory experiments is that we can control for important factors like buyers'valuation, quality or attributes of the product and beliefs about price distributions in the market place, which is di¢ cult in the …eld.
We employ a two-shop search model, where we manipulate the price framing across treatments. In a baseline search model, two shops sell a homogeneous product and independently draw their prices from given price distributions. A consumer has a given valuation for the product and wants to buy one unit of it. The consumer is in shop one initially and observes the price charged there. The price charged in shop two is unknown to the shopper. She is aware of the distribution the price is drawn from though. The subject has to decide if she want to pay some search cost and move to shop two. Once arrived at shop two, the price there is revealed to the shopper, who can decide to buy or to exit the market. Recalling the price at shop one after searching is not possible. The same decision task is repeated 20 times with the prices being newly drawn from the according distributions.
In this simple setup we present the same search task in three di¤erent ways: without any discounts, with a discount frame in shop one and with a discount frame in shop two. Equivalence of the search task across the three di¤erent framing conditions is achieved by shifting the gross price distributions to o¤set the discounts such that the net price distributions of both shops are the same for all frames. If subjects are una¤ected by the price framing, then behavior in these three conditions should be identical. In addition, we vary the net price distributions of the two shops.
This variation serves as a robustness check of the framing e¤ects if they exist. For each price frame, we have three di¤erent treatments with the expected net price in the second shop being higher, equal or lower than that in the …rst shop. This 3 3 design allows for a clean isolation of the pure framing e¤ect of price discounts. 2
Search decisions of rational buyers should depend on the net price o¤ered in shop one, the search cost and the net price distribution in shop two. As the search decision is essentially a binary choice between a …xed o¤er from shop one and a lottery o¤er from shop two (as in e.g. Holt and Laury 2002) , buyers'risk preferences also play an important role in the decision process. In order to be able to identify potential price-framing e¤ects and discount biases we structurally estimate risk-preference parameters and the size of biases. We …nd that risk-preference parameters are stable over time and across di¤erent levels of search incentives. This provides some evidence that our model is properly speci…ed.
More importantly, we …nd discount biases in both treatments. Consumers tend to over-value a discount that is provided in the initial shop, while they do not su¢ ciently value a discount provided by the shop the subjects does not yet know the price of. Both biases can be explained by salience. A discount is clearly salient when it is provided where a consumer is, whereas it is not if it is o¤ered in a shop that the consumer has not yet entered. As a consequence in both treatments with discounts lead consumers to search less for given initial prices than in the treatment without discounts. The discount biases are initially of the same size (about a third of the discount). In later periods the discount bias for shop one tends to disappear, while it is persistent for discounts o¤ered in the second shop.
The main insight from our paper is the following. Both observed price-framing 2 There exist quite some experimental studies investigating costly search behavior (e.g. Schotter and Braunstein 1981; Braunstein and Schotter 1982; Kogut 1990; Kogut 1992; Cox and Oaxaca 1989; Cox and Oaxaca 1992; Grether et al. 1988; David and Holt 1996; Abrams et al. 2000; Cason and Friedman 2003; Cason et al. 2005; Morgan et al. 2006; Cason and Datta 2006; Cason and Datta 2010) . However, none of them looks at the price-framing e¤ects of discounts. e¤ects reduce the consumers' propensity to search. This suggests that …rms can use discount frames without actually reducing net prices in order to reduce the competitiveness of markets. according to our …ndings, discount frames reduce the search intensity, which gives more market power to the …rms that use them. By exploiting the price-framing e¤ects on search …rms are able to sustain higher net prices in general. This is good news for …rms but bad news for those who are concerned with consumer welfare and allocating e¢ ciency.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 3, we describe the experimental design and the standard theoretical predictions for the underlying model. In Section 4 we provide summary statistics on buyers'decisions. In Section 5 we report on a structural maximum likelihood estimation of discount bias and risk parameter, followed by a discussion on potential explanations. Finally, we o¤er some concluding remarks in Section 6.
Related …eld experiments
Most of the marketing studies referred to above typically su¤er from some methodological problems. Firstly, the experiments are often not properly incentivized.
Secondly, the results often rely on survey questions, hypothetical choices or recalled data. Some recent experiments related to our laboratory experiments have overcome these problems. In a fully incentivized auction experiment, Morwitz et al. (1998) …nd that partitioned prices can increase demand. Participants also recall lower prices if they were previously presented with prices containing multiple components. In a nice …eld experiment on eBay, Hossain and Morgan (2006) manipulate the opening bid and the shipping cost, while keeping the total reserve price constant. The study shows that the …nal sale price is higher when the opening bid is relatively low (and shipping cost are relatively high) than when the relation between opening bid and shipping cost is reversed. Furthermore, in a follow-up online auction experiment, Brown et al. (2010) study whether …rms should disclose or shroud shipping costs.
They …nd that disclosing small shipping cost, or shrouding high shipping cost increases revenue. Using scanner data in supermarkets, Chetty et al. (2009) establish that consumers respond more strongly to a tax increase if the tax is printed on the price tag than if it is added at the register. These studies provide …eld evidence that price presentation matters.
Our study complements the existing literature by adding a so far neglected dimension -consumer search. The decision to purchase a certain good or not, typically does not only depend on the price (and its framing) in a single shop. It should also be relevant how a consumer perceives the price relative to expected prices for the same good charged by other shops. A consumer will buy the good from a certain shop if it is perceived to be relatively cheap there. If it is perceived as relatively expensive, then the shopper might visit other shops and search for a lower price as long as the associated search cost is not too high. Since price framing a¤ects consumers' perception of net prices (established by the studies mentioned above), it can be expected that it also impacts on search decisions. We use a laboratory environment here, since it is di¢ cult to impossible to control for shoppers'beliefs about expected prices in other shops.
If price presentation really impacts on search decisions, then price framing becomes an economically important phenomenon. In a world where consumers are not perfectly informed about prices and have to spend time, e¤ort and money to gather information, the way consumers search has a strong impact on the market power of …rms and their pricing behavior. 3 Search intensity (as induced by search cost, price expectations, and other things) in ‡uences the market prices in equilibrium. Ceteris paribus, the more consumers are inclined to search the stronger is the pressure to compete on price. Prices decrease and welfare increases with higher search intensity (Stahl 1989, Robert and Stahl 1993) .
Experimental design
Often, search models and the computation of the resulting optimal stopping rule are quite complex. In this experiment, our aim is to test neither theoretical search models nor the computation ability of our subjects. Therefore, we chose an extremely simple search environment, which minimizes the calculation e¤ort required by subjects. This enables us to look for the existence of pure price framing e¤ects.
By keeping the environment as simple and transparent as possible we stack the deck against …nding biases stemming from price framing. So if we …nd price-framing e¤ects in our simple arti…cial world, then we would also expect them to present in the real world, which is much more complex. Our treatments consist of variations of the following simple search task.
A two-shop search task
Subjects are asked to buy one unit of a homogeneous good which is worth v monetary units to them. There are two shops (1 and 2) selling this good. The price o¤ered by each shop is randomly and independently drawn from uniform distributions.
The subjects know the price distributions of both shops in advance, but not the particular prices o¤ered by each shop. Following the convention in search theory, the price draw in shop 1; is given to the subjects for free. After observing this price (p 1 ) subjects face three options: (1) Exit, which yields zero pro…t; (2) Buy at p 1 , the payo¤ is equal to the valuation (v) less the net price (p 1net ); (3) Search (i.e., the subject pays a search cost c to visit shop 2 and to learn the price p 2 charged there). Recall is not possible. Once search is chosen the price in shop one is no longer available. After having chosen search, subjects can decide either to (a) Buy at p 2 (the pro…t is given by v p 2net c where p 2net is the net price o¤ered by shop two), or (b) Exit with a loss of c.
Treatments
Building on this baseline search task, our experiment consists of nine treatments.
The buyers' valuation (v = 200) and the search cost (c = 5) are held constant across all treatments. The nine treatments result from a three-step variation in the two dimensions of price framing and price distributions. Table 1 summarizes the parameter values used in each treatment. On the horizontal dimension in Table 1, we have three di¤erent frames No-D, Shop1-D, and Shop2-D, which correspond to "there is no discount in any shop", "only shop one o¤ers a discount"and "only shop two o¤ers a discount."On the vertical dimension in Table 1, 
L-Incentive: Within a search incentive level, the search task in each of the three treatments is essentially the same. The price frames do not change the net-price distributions in both shops. Take the M-Incentive treatments (T4, T5, T6 ) as an example. In the No-D treatment (T4) neither shop o¤ers a discount. Prices are randomly and independently drawn from uniform distributions. Subjects see the …rst price and then make their decisions. The price they see is the price they pay. In the Shop1-D treatment (T5), the search task follows the same procedure as that in the No-D treatments except that subjects are told in advance that shop one always o¤ers a discount (d 1 = 15), which will be deducted from the price. At the same time, the gross price distribution in shop one is moved up by 15 monetary units to [90; 190] :
This shift exactly o¤sets the bene…t of the discount o¤ered. Similarly, in the Shop2-D treatment (T6 ), subjects were told in advance that shop two always o¤ers a discount of d 2 = 15: The gross price distribution in shop two is shifted upwards by 15 units to o¤set the discount. Consequently, the underlying decision problem across the di¤erent price frame is identical within the M-Incentive treatment. The same manipulation is used for the L-Incentive and the H-Incentive treatments. The variation on price frames (while holding the net price distributions constant) will be used to identify the price-framing e¤ects of discounts.
Benchmark predictions
There are three theoretical predictions for the behavior of rational buyers. Firstly, exit is obviously a strictly dominated option in both stages. In all treatments, buy generates a positive pro…t even if the highest possible price is drawn, whereas exit yields non-positive pro…ts. Secondly, as illustrated above the search problems (in di¤erent price-discount frames) are objectively identical when the search incentive is held constant. Note that this implies that a subject, who is not a¤ected by framing, should use the same decision rule for all decision problems within one incentive condition, regardless of her risk preferences. So the search intensity S (i.e. the fraction of search decisions) should be identical within an incentive condition.
Lastly, as we increase the ex ante incentive to search while holding the price framing constant the search intensity S should increase. These predictions are summarized in Table 2 .
-Incentive: 
Experimental procedure
The search task was programmed and implemented in the laboratory using z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007) . We conducted all experimental sessions at AdLab, the Adelaide University Laboratory for Experimental Economics. In each session, one treatment was randomly assigned to each subject. Within a treatment the same search task was repeated 20 times. The price distributions and the availability of the discount were not changed throughout a treatment. The procedure, the search task and the payo¤s were explained to the subjects in written instructions (see samples in the Appendix). The subjects were paid privately at the end of their session according to their performance (Experimental Dollars were converted into Australian Dollars at a given exchange rate). In total, 293 university students from various disciplines participated in the experiment. Subjects had no experience with similar tasks in the laboratory and earned on average AUD 9.2 (about $10 US) in approximately 30 minutes. 4
A …rst look at search behavior
It is encouraging that in our 5860 search tasks subject only chose exit in 0:6% of the cases in shop one and in 3:3% of the cases in shop two. We conclude from the small proportion of obviously irrational behavior that the subjects in general understood the search task. We now turn to the decision we are mostly interested in -the search decision. Table 3 provides a summary of search fractions across treatments.
Compared to the theoretical predictions on search intensity given in Section 3.3, our results are mixed. In the L-Incentive treatments, the average fraction of buyers, who search is 38:43% (No-D), 35:63% (Shop1-D) and 34:66% (Shop2-D). The search intensity increases to 54:46%, 48:67% and 45:71% in the M-Incentive treatments, and further increases to 58:39%, 58:89% and 57:92% in the H-Incentive treatments.
The variation of search frequencies along the incentive dimension is as predicted.
Higher search incentives lead to more searching. However, comparing the search fractions at the same incentive level, we do not observe identical search intensities across di¤erent price frames. Figure 1 plots the relation between smoothed search fractions and the net price in shop one for a given level of search incentives. 5 We provide the same graphs separately for the data from the …rst and the second half of the experiment.
The left panel of the graph shows that in the …rst ten periods subjects searched more in the No-D treatments (in solid lines) than in the Shop1-D (in dashed lines)
or Shop2-D treatments (in dotted lines). This is true for all incentive levels. Initially both discount frames -regardless of where the discount is given -reduce the search intensity at given net prices in shop one: The di¤erence becomes smaller in the second half of the experiment, as the right panel shows. But there is still less searching if than in the other two framing conditions. However, it is hard to tell from the graphs if the search intensity is still signi…cantly di¤erent between the Shop2-D frame, the discount in shop one (Shop1-D) and the net price frame (No-D).
Overall the aggregate results provide some support for the existence of priceframing e¤ects on consumer search behavior. At the same time there is also some support for the theoretical predictions, as the search intensity increases with the incentives to search. Also, the di¤erences along the price-frame dimension appear to become smaller in the second half of the experiment. Given these …ndings on the aggregate level, we believe that it is worthwhile to further explore the price-framing e¤ect using a more in-depth analysis that allows for proper statistical tests.
Structural estimation
Our experiments implement a model of consumer search under uncertainty. The search decision is essentially an individual decision under risk, i.e., a binary choice between a …xed payment o¤ered by shop one and a lottery o¤ered by shop two.
The decision may depend on the price and discount o¤ered by the …rst shop, the price distribution and discount o¤ered at the second shop, on the search cost and also on the risk preferences of the consumer. In our analysis estimating risk preferences is crucial, as they are unobserved, while the other determinants have been controlled for. Previous experimental studies aiming to test search theory, typically compare observed behavior to the theoretical predictions under risk-neutrality. This approximation can greatly reduce the computational demands for solving complex search models, especially when the time horizon is …nite. However, risk neutrality is a strong assumption. Our simple design allows us to relax this assumption and conduct a structural estimation of underlying risk-aversion coe¢ cients and discount biases. The estimation is based on expected utility theory (EUT) and the noisy probabilistic choice model proposed by Holt and Laury (2002) .
An expected-utility maximizer' s decision rule
We assume that the utility function is given by u(x) = x r (for x > 0), where x is the monetary payo¤ and r is the risk parameter to be estimated. A utility function of this form exhibits constant relative risk aversion (CRRA). We believe that CRRA is appropriate, as the stakes in our experiment are moderate. Decisions in gambles that do not signi…cantly change an individual's lifetime wealth can be appropriately described by CRRA. The risk parameter r implies a proclivity to risk if r > 1, risk-neutrality if r = 1, and risk-aversion if r < 1.
The consumers in our experiments have to choose between a safe payo¤ from buying (yielding an utility U (B)) and a lottery over the prices at shop two resulting in an expected utility EU (S) from searching. We allow for discount dependent biases b 1 and b 2 ; where the subscript indicates whether the discount is given in shop one or two. Our discount biases can be interpreted as the money equivalent for by how much the consumer overvalues the savings from the discount. A negative bias is interpreted as the money equivalent for by how much the subjects undervalue the savings provided by the discount.
Denoting the discount as d (i.e. 15 in our experiments) the values of U (B) and
EU (S) can be calculated as follows:
(1)
The function f (p) is the density of the price distribution; p and p are the minimum and maximum prices. Given the uniform distributions we adopt (with f (p) = 1=a, a = p p = 100); EU (S) can be expressed as
A rational expected utility maximizer always chooses the option, which yields the higher expected utility. The probability of search in this case is a step function:
(4) Figure 1 shows that there is no clear cuto¤ price in the data. Therefore we are allowing individuals to make some decision errors. We still expect that the probability of search increases with the di¤erence between EU (S) and U (B) though.
A simple probabilistic decision rule capturing this is:
This formulation is ‡exible with respect to the likelihood of errors. As the noise in the decision process increases, subjects will become less sensitive to payo¤ di¤erences between the two alternatives and hence the randomness of the decision increases. In the extreme case, where approaches in…nity, the probability of search will approach one-half, regardless of the values of U (B) and EU (S). Subjects make purely random choices when the noise is in…nitely large. On the other hand, when approaches 0 the probability of choosing the option associated with the higher (expected) utility approaches one and the decision maker becomes fully rational as de…ned by (4). With Equations (1), (3), (5) and (6) we have a model of noisy consumer search that can easily be put to the data. The probability of search depends on known variables (net price in shop one, the net-price distribution in shop two) and on unknown parameters ; r, b 1 , b 2 , which we will estimate.
Estimation equation and results
Our main focus is to estimate by how much consumers over or under-value a discount in a given shop (i.e., b 1 or b 2 ) and whether a potential bias is persistent or vanishes over time. For this reason we specify the biases as constants with an additive dummy variable for the last ten periods D T 10 + :
In addition, we specify the risk-preference parameter such that we can control for individual heterogeneity in risk preferences and also check the robustness of our model speci…cation. We allow the risk parameter to be a function of individual characteristics, as well as search incentives and a time dummy: Moreover, it is reasonable to assume that subjects get better at the task as the experiment progresses (i.e., subjects learn and gradually make fewer errors). For this reason we allow the noise parameter to have a time trend: Table 4 : Estimation results of the discount biases, risk and noise parameters.
In Table 4 we report the results of our estimation, which allows for error clustering on the subject level. Recall that an increase in the risk parameter r indicates a higher propensity to take risks, where r = 1 (risk neutrality) separates risk-averse subjects from risk lovers. The risk parameter of a base-category subject is around 1:243, which is close to risk neutrality. 6 We …nd that risk preferences are stable over time and across the conditions with di¤erent search incentives. The coe¢ cients on the dummy variables D T 10 + , M-Incentive and H-Incentive are not signi…cant.
There is considerable heterogeneity in risk preferences. Subjects with better Maths background, studying Medicine, Commerce/Finance, Law and Arts are willing to take more risk.
The estimated noise parameter starts o¤ with 0:4 in the …rst period. As expected, the amount of noise in the decision process signi…cantly decreases over time as subjects become familiar with the task. By period 20, has decreased to about 0:15, which indicates a very reasonable level of rationality. The stability of risk preference over time and across search-incentive levels and the declining noise are …ndings one expects for a properly speci…ed model. This gives some support that the choice of utility function and controls is appropriate.
We now turn to the …rst part of Table 4 and concentrate on discount biases.
A discount initially o¤ered in shop one leads to behavior as if the discount were about 5:9 units larger than it actually is. This bias is substantial, since its size is more than a third of the actual discount of 15 units. If the discount is o¤ered in shop 2, then subjects behave as is they under-value the discount by 5:6 units.
Comparing the discounts as perceived by the consumers, leads to the observation that a discount o¤ered in a shop which is already visited by the consumer is seen as providing more than twice the savings as the same discount in a shop that is not visited yet. Regardless where the discount is o¤ered, consumers are less inclined to search in both discount treatments.
However, the discount bias disappears over time for discount vouchers o¤ered in the …rst shop. In the second half of the experiment the discount bias for shop one is reduced by 3:5 units. The remaining bias is not signi…cantly di¤erent from zero anymore (p > 0:16; Chow test). For discounts given in shop two the situation is di¤erent. There the (negative) discount bias does not disappear. The change in the second half of the experiment is not signi…cant but rather hints at a strengthening than a weakening discount bias.
The result of a negative and persistent bias for shop two seems surprising, as it implies that the knowledge that there are discounts in shop two does not, as one might expect, lure people into searching more. On the contrary, knowing that shop two o¤ers discounts persistently reduces the propensity to search compared to the situation where shop two posts net prices. One plausible explanation for our …nding is that the saliency of discount vouchers is location dependent. Suppose that subjects use short-cuts when they take decisions. 7 In order to save cognitive resources a subject gathers the salient characteristics of a situation and makes decisions based on them. Then in our Shop1-D treatments the discount is clearly salient, as a subject experiences it before making a choice. This might lead to subjects (at least initially) overvaluing the discount in their decision. 8 Less search than in the No-D is the consequence. However, it is not very di¢ cult to learn that using the discount in the …rst shop as a salient characteristic for the search decision is not very sensible.
The calculation of the net price is very easy, since there are no distributions involved once they see the …rst price, and only a simple subtraction is needed. Consequently, experience leads to a shift from the discount to the net price as the decision relevant characteristic and the discount bias disappears over time.
In the Shop2-D treatments circumstances are di¤erent. The discount is not salient, since it is not yet experienced. The immediate focus goes to the risk of searching. The risk of searching comes from not knowing the price in the second shop and is represented by the price distribution, which becomes salient. The expected net price and the impact of the discount are not properly taken into account.
Consequently, consumers search less in Shop2-D than in No-D. This phenomenon is more persistent than that in the Shop1-D case, as it needs more cognitive energy to learn that the focus on the gross price leads to distortions in the decision. The net price in the second shop with a discount is partly unknown at the time of decision and cannot just be computed as p 2net = p 2 d:
Our design allows us to see whether subjects really focus on the gross price and ignore the discount o¤er in the second shop, when a discount is o¤ered. Take treatments 1, 4 and 9. Treatments 1 and 4 are treatments without discounts, where the price distribution for the second shop is uniform over the range of 75 to 175:
Treatment 9 is the high-incentive treatment with a discount in shop 2; where the gross price (not taking into account the discount) is also uniformly distributed on 75 to 175: If our suspicion that subjects mainly focus on the gross distribution in the latter treatment is correct, then search behavior for given prices in shop one (where there are no discounts in all three treatment) should be identical. 9 This can be assessed graphically by plotting the smoothed relationship between search 9 An expected utility maximiser would search more in this treatment, of course.
fractions and initial prices, as done earlier. Figure 2 shows that there is virtually no di¤erence between search rules, which gives some support for our claim that the discounts in shop two are not taken into account. An estimation including only the data from treatments 1, 4 and 9; (which can be obtained on request from the authors) also shows that there is no signi…cant di¤erence in search behavior between the treatment with a discount (T 9 ) and those without (T 1 ; T 4 ). 10
Conclusion
Retailers regularly post gross prices and at the same time announce discounts instead of just posting net prices. This paper examines the impact of the discount frame on search behavior. A two-stage search model was used in the laboratory for this purpose. We designed our experimental treatments such that the search tasks were theoretically identical across di¤erent price frames. We compared two types of experimental treatments (in which the price in either of the shops was presented as a gross price with a discount) to their corresponding baseline treatments (where prices in both shops were given as net prices). To achieve this we shifted the gross-price distributions, such that the net price distributions were identical.
A structural estimation revealed that subjects'behavior exhibited a discount bias.
Subjects searched less, when discounts are present regardless where the discount was o¤ered. The bias disappeared with experience if the discount was o¤ered in the shop where the consumer knew the price already. In contrast, the bias persisted if the discount was o¤ered in the shop that the consumers had not yet visited. We conclude that …rms can reduce the competitiveness of their markets by framing prices as discounts. Discounts generally reduce search intensity, which is positively related to the competitiveness of the outcome in a market.
A Experimental Instructions (online appendix possible)
Thank you for participating in this experiment. Please read the instructions carefully. This is important, as your earnings will depend on your performance. Please note that you are not allowed to communicate with other participants during the experiment. If you do not obey this rule we may exclude you from the experiment.
If you have any questions, please raise your hand. We will come to answer your questions individually.
The currency in this game is called E-Dollars. At the end of the game we will convert the E-Dollars you have earned in the game to real money. The exchange rate is 100 E-Dollars =0.6 Australian Dollars.
Your task
Suppose you want to buy one unit of a certain good. You value the good at 200 E-Dollars. Your pro…t will either be this valuation (200 E-Dollars) minus the price you pay for the good if you decide to buy, or zero if you do not buy the good.
There are two shops, which may sell at di¤erent prices. The prices at each shop are determined randomly and independently. However, you do not know the prices until you have arrived at a particular shop. The only things you know in advance are that the price is drawn according to the rules given below. Moving from shop 1 to 2 will lead to a search cost of 5 E-Dollars.
The prices at both shops will be in the range between 75 and 175 E-Dollars, where all prices are equally likely. You can think of the following: Shopkeeper one draws randomly from an urn with balls numbered 75 to 175. The number of the ball he draws is the price. Shopkeeper two has his own urn with balls numbered 75 to 175, where he draws from.
The game's timing is as follows:
1. You arrive at shop 1 and observe the price at shop 1 (P 1 ). You have three options:
A-1 (a) EXIT, the game ends and your pro…t is zero.
(b) BUY HERE, the game ends and your pro…t is 200 P 1 :
(c) GO TO THE NEXT SHOP, you learn the price of the second shop (P 2 ) and incur search cost of 5 E-Dollars.
2. If you have chosen to go to the next shop you learn the price charged by the second shop (P 2 ). You have two options now, which both end the game:
(a) EXIT, with a total pro…t of 5:
(b) BUY, which gives you a total pro…t of 200 P 2 5. Note that 5 represents the cost of moving from shop 1 to shop 2.
The diagram below summarizes the game:
Stage 1 Stage 2
Observe p 1 : 1: Exit (prof it = 0) 2: Buy (prof it = 200 p 1 ) 3: Search (i.e., go to shop 2, observe p 2 )! 3.1: Exit (prof it = 5) 3.2: Buy (prof it = 200 p 2 5)
Repetition
You will play 20 of these games in succession. Note that the prices are newly drawn in each of the games. The prices are independent across games. Prices are not in ‡uenced by the prices of the previous game. If you have any questions please raise your hand. We will come and answer your question.
A-2
Your task
There are two shops, which may sell at di¤erent prices. The prices at each shop are determined randomly and independently. However, you do not know the prices until you have arrived at a particular shop. The only things you know in advance are that the price is drawn according to the rules given below, and that you will be granted a discount of 15 E-Dollars at the …rst shop (because you have got a rebate voucher). You also know that moving from shop 1 to 2 will lead to a search cost of The game's timing is as follows:
(a) EXIT, the game ends and your pro…t is zero.
(b) BUY HERE, the game ends and your pro…t is 200 P 1 + 15: Note that +15 represents the discount if you buy from the …rst shop.
A-3 (c) GO TO THE NEXT SHOP, you learn the price of the second shop (P 2 ) and incur search cost of 5 E-Dollars.
Observe p 1 : 1: Exit (prof it = 0) 2: Buy (prof it = 200 p 1 + 15) 3: Search (i.e., go to shop 2, observe p 2 )! 3.1: Exit (prof it = 5) 3.2: Buy (prof it = 200 p 2 5)
Repetition
A.3 M-Incentive & Shop2-D treatment
A-4
Your task
There are two shops, which may sell at di¤erent prices. The prices at each shop are determined randomly and independently. However, you do not know the prices until you have arrived at a particular shop. The only things you know in advance are that the price is drawn according to the rules given below, and that you will be granted a discount of 15 E-Dollars at the second shop (because you have got a rebate voucher). You also know that moving from shop 1 to 2 will lead to a search cost of 5 E-Dollars.
The The game's timing is as follows:
A-5 (b) BUY, which gives you a total pro…t of 200 P 2 + 15 5. Note that 5
represents the cost of moving from shop 1 to shop 2, while the +15 is the discount if you buy from the second shop.
Observe p 1 : 1: Exit (prof it = 0) 2: Buy (prof it = 200 p 1 ) 3: Search (i.e., go to shop 2, observe p 2 )! 3.1: Exit (prof it = 5) 3.2: Buy (prof it = 200 p 2 + 15 5)
Repetition
A-6
